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he crisis that started in Greece has given birth to a new crisis of the eurozone as a whole. 
There is no doubt that the major responsibility rests with the Greek authorities who 
mismanaged their economy and then deceived everyone about the true nature of their 
budgetary problems. The financial markets and the eurozone authorities, however, also bear part 
of the responsibility for letting the crisis degenerate into a systemic crisis of the eurozone.  
The financial markets showed how unreliable their judgments can be in moving from excessive 
optimism before the crisis to deepest pessimism after the crisis broke. The use of CDS (credit 
defaults swaps) allows market participants driven by pessimism to speculate in unlimited 
amounts against particular countries, thereby greatly amplifying underlying problems.  
The crisis was allowed to unfold also because of missteps on the part of both the eurozone 
governments and the ECB. The eurozone governments failed to give a clear signal of their 
readiness to support Greece. The ECB, in turn, created ambiguities about the eligibility of Greek 
government debt as collateral in liquidity provision. 
The Greek government debt crisis should and can be stopped. It should be stopped because 
failure to do so could set in motion an unstoppable process of contagion that would affect the 
entire banking sector of the EU. This would in the end force governments to bail out banks once 
again at great economic costs. Thus the choice today is between two evils. The first one arises 
from moral hazard. Bailing out Greece is bad because it gives a signal that irresponsible 
behaviour will not be punished. The second evil arises from the contagious effects of letting 
Greece default. Authorities have to choose for the lesser evil, which in this case is the second 
one. This is also the choice that was made when they bailed out the banks that had been at least 
as irresponsible as the Greek government.  
The Greek government debt crisis can be stopped. There can be little doubt that the eurozone 
member countries have the financial capacity to bail out Greece if the need arises. It would not 
cost them that much: if Greece were to default on the full amount of its outstanding debt, a bail-
out by the other eurozone governments would add about 3% to these governments’ debt levels. 
This would be a very small number compared to the sums spent to save the banks during the 
financial crisis. 
The crisis has exposed a structural problem of the eurozone, created by the fact that the 
monetary union is not embedded in a political union. This imbalance leads to a dynamics of 
creeping divergencies between member states and there is no mechanism to correct or alleviate 
it. These divergencies in turn are at the core of budgetary divergencies and crises. 
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Ideally the eurozone member countries should move forward into a closer political union, but 
there is very little prospect of this happening in a significant way in the foreseeable future. 
Some small steps are possible however. One is the creation of a European Monetary Fund; the 
other is the creation of common Euro bonds designed in such a way to minimise the moral 
hazard problem (see elaboration of these ideas in the papers referenced below). These steps 
have the important quality of signalling a determination on the part of the eurozone members to 
commit themselves to a future intensification of the process of political union. 
Of related interest: P. De Grauwe and W. Moesen, “Gains for All: A Proposal for a Common Euro 
Bond”, Intereconomics, May/June 2009 and D. Gros and T. Mayer, Towards a Euro(pean) Monetary 
Fund, CEPS Policy Brief, No. 202, February 2010. 